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COMMENTS
ST. LOUIS & O'FALLON RAILWAY CASE
At last we have the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the celebrated case of the United States v. St. Louis
& O'Fallon Railway Company;' but the decision is not what
many had hoped it would be either from the standpoint of sub-
stance or from the standpoint of form, that is, as to what it
decided or how it decided it.
In this much advertised case there was presented to the Su-
preme Court an opportunity to give a final and authoritative
answer as to what is the correct rate base for the regulation
of public utilities. In a number of preceding cases this same
question had been presented to the Supreme Court; but the
Supreme Court had not given what was regarded as the final
answer to the question, although, beginning with Smyth v. Ames2
where it announced as the rate basis "fair value"-a composite
of a number of mutually exclusive factors, one which was re-
production cost-it had more and more been emphasizing re-
production cost, until with McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Com-
pany 3 it seemed to go over entirely to this theory, because it
chose this as the basis of determining "fair value" to the exclu-
sion of everything else.4 The Interstate Commerce Commission
had looked at the matter differently, and in spite of the prior
attitude of the United States Supreme Court, when the St. Louis
and O'Fallon Railway case came before it, it considered repro-
duction cost and used it in its split inventory method to deter-
mine the value of the property in 1914 and as to values of land,
additions and betterments since 1914; but it refused to apply
present reproduction cost to values before 1914, and turned
aside to point out the economic fallacies of reproduction cost
and the advantages of prudent investment as a standard of
value for rate making purposes.5 Consequently when the case
was finally appealed to the Supreme Court it was hoped that
the Supreme Court would either agree with the Interstate Com-
1 (1929) 49 Sup. Ch. 384.
2 (1898) 169 U. S. 466.
3 (1926) 272 U. S. 400.
4 (1927) 3 Indiana Law Journ. 225-232.
5 Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Railway Company (1927). 124
I. C. C. 4.
120
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merce Commission, or if it disagreed would meet its arguments
and take a position which would finally settle the matter.
Instead of doing either one of these things, the Supreme Court
by a six to three decision took a third position. It did not un-
dertake to answer the arguments of the Interstate Commerce
Commission against reproduction cost. It did not expressly
adopt reproduction cost as the exclusive rate base. It merely
decided that the Interstate Commerce Commission had not given
enough weight to reproduction cost. It took this position be-
cause paragraph 4, Section 15a of the Transportation Act of 1920
"directs that, in determining values of railway property for
purposes of recapture, the Commission 'shall give due considera-
tion to all the elements of value recognized by the law of the
land for rate making purposes,'" and because it held that the
elements of value recognized by the "law of the land" for rate
making purposes had been pointed out by the Supreme Court
in a long line of decisions, citing Smyth v. Ames,6 Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co.,7 Minnesota Rate Case,8 Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission,9 Bluefield
Water Works v. Public Service Commission,o McCardle v. In-
dianapolis Water Co.,"- of which it specifically emphasized
Smyth v. Ames, and Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission, and that in these elements of value re-
production cost was included. Therefore, it concluded that re-
production cost was an element of value which had to be con-
sidered by the Interstate Commerce Commission, that it had
not done this and therefore that its decree had to be reversed.
The answer to the majority opinion of the Supreme Court is
threefold. First, as pointed out by Justice Brandeis and Jus-
tice Stone in their dissenting opinions, the Interstate Commerce
Commission did give due consideration to reproduction cost as
an element of value.
Second. Reproduction cost had not at the time of the pas-
sage of the Transportation Act in 1920 become recognized by
the law of the land, as either the sole element of value of such
6 (1898) 169 U. S. 466.
7 (1909) 212 U. S. 19.
8 (1913) 230 U. S. 352.
9 (1923) 262 U. S. 276.
10 (1923) 262 U. S. 679.
11 (1926) 272 U. S. 400.
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paramount importance as one element, that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission could not itself decide what weight it should
give to it when directed to consider all the elements of value
recognized by the law of the land, even if Congress had other-
wise been silent as to its intention. The McCardle Case was
not decided until six years after the passage of the Transpor-
tation Act, and Congress could not, therefore, have had that
decision in mind. Even the Southwestern Bell Case, and the
Bluefield Water Works Case (cited by the majority opinion)
were decided after the Transportation Act, and could not have
helped to make reproduction cost any part of the "law of the
land" to which the Act of Congress referred. Smyth v. Ames
and the Minnesota Rate Case did not put reproduction cost in
any such exalted position. Smyth v. Ames adopted as the rate
base fair value, but in ascertaining fair value named as matters
of consideration a number of mutually exclusive elements one
of which only was "present as compared with the original cost
of construction." The Minnesota Rate Case continued to wal-
low in the uncertainties of the kaleidoscopic rule of Smyth v.
Ames. It follows that it was not only necessary but that it was
contrary to its own prior decisions rendered before 1920 for
the Supreme Court to read the meaning it did into the phrase
"law of the land." How could the Supreme Court say that re-
production cost, as an element of value for rate making pur-
poses, was a part of the law of the land in 1920 when neither
it nor anyone else knew what was the law of the land on this
point at that time?
Third. Congress was not altogether silent as to the mean-
ing it intended to be given to the phrase "law of the land," for
the Transportation Act itself shows that Congress intended no
such meaning for the phrase as the Supreme Court read into
it. If Congress itself had substituted for the phrase "law of
the land" the phrase "reproduction cost"-as apparently the
Supreme Court has done in practical effect, or "prudent invest-
ment"--as the Interstate Commerce Commission would do, the
Supreme Court perhaps might conceivably have held that either
of such actions was not due process of law, (although it prob-
ably would not and should not have done so); but it certainly
could not have held that one as much as the other was not a
part of the law of the land or that either had become perma-
nently a part of the law of the land (as this phrase was used
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in the act). The phrase was evidently used by Congress from
superabundance of caution to make the act constitutional. Hence,
Congress refrained from definitely naming the rate base in
order not to raise the question of depriving the railroads of their
property without due process of law, and simply said it should
be whatever was the "law of the land." However, provided it
was constitutional and if the only question was a matter of in-
tention, Congress elsewhere in the act indicated very clearly
that is desired as the rate base something more than reproduc-
tion cost, either alone or as the decisive factor. Justice Brandeis
has fully developed this point.12 Since the majority opinion did
not raise a due process point but merely interpreted the mean-
ing of the phrase "law of the land" as used by Congress, it
would seem that it pursued a strange course to ascertain the
intention of Congress; and, instead of finding the intention of
Congress, found what would have been its own intention, if it
had been Congress, and then made this the intention of Con-
gress.
From the standpoint of form the majority opinion of the Su-
preme Court seems weak. Its own argument is illogical. It
does not meet the argument of the opposing dissenting opinions
nor that of the Interstate Commerce Commission opinion. From
the standpoint of substance the opinion is unsatisfactory. It does
not directly make reproduction cost the rate base for rate regu-
lation, although it indirectly almost seems to have this practical
effect; but it theoretically leaves the question of what is a proper
rate base where it was left by Smyth v. Ames. This means
that we do not have much of anything decided by the St. Louis
and O'Fallon Case but must look for another case to settle the
point which has remained unsettled so long. As a consequence
at the present time as a result of this decision we have for the
rate base either reproduction cost or a congeries of all the di-
verse elements in the rule of Smyt~h v. Ames. If the rate base
is reproduction cost we have a rule unfair either to the public
or the public utility, uncertain in result and impractical in oper-
ation. If the rate base is the composite of all the mutually ex-
clusive elements enumerated in Smyth v. Ames, we have again
to traverse the route that leads away from this impossible de-
cision.s
12 (1929) 49 Sup. Ch. 392-406.
13 (1927) 3 Indiana Law Journal 224-232.
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Of course the immediate and practical result of the decision
is to give the railways and all other public callings a right to
more earnings and the railways a power to prevent the recap-
ture of what formerly were regarded as excess earnings. This
would give them the right to higher rates to enable them to earn
a reasonable return on the higher rate base given them. How-
ever, there has not been and may not be any sudden and great
increase in railway rates. The ecomonic situation is such at
the present time, because of the development of motor trans-
portation, as to make this not possible. But since the technical
legal right has been established there will always be a possibility
of such increase in rates should the economic situation be
changed so as to permit it, and meanwhile the electric power
companies, laboring under no such handicap as the railroads,
are taking advantage of the decision and entrenching themselves
in a position from which they may never be driven.
HUGH E. WILLIS,
Indiana University School of Law.
